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Regulating Humanitarian Assistance by
Australian Charities: Legal Tools to Deter
Funding of Terrorism Abroad
Gregory Rose *
What are the obligations and risks in Australian law confronting the managers
of charitable funds disbursed overseas to conflict zones where funds may be
diverted into political violence? The 2016 allegations against World Vision
Australia for funding HAMAS are described here as a case study of applicable
Australian laws. Apparent gaps in the administrative, civil and criminal
regulatory framework are identified and are contrasted with approaches in
other common law jurisdictions: Canada, England and Wales, and the United
States. Based upon these comparisons, recommendations are made to
address perceived defects in the regulatory framework to counter financing
of terrorism abroad by Australian not-for-profit organisations.

INTRODUCTION
Men are more often bribed by their loyalties and ambitions than by money.
Robert H Jackson J, dissenting opinion in United States v Wunderlich 342 US 98 (1951).

HAMAS is an internationally listed terrorist organisation and rules Gaza following its success in an
election there that distinguishes its popularity from similarly listed regional terrorist organisations that
rule in parts of Libya, Mali, Somalia and Syria. 1 An engineer working for the UN Development
Programme in Gaza, Waheed Borsch, was convicted in Israel in January 2017 for diverting materials
to build a naval jetty for HAMAS. 2 The director of World Vision in the Gaza strip was charged in
August 2016 with diverting millions of dollars over a decade from that global charity to HAMAS. 3
HAMAS rockets were stored in UN Welfare and Relief Agency schools in 2014. 4 A Palestinian aid
worker in Gaza for Save the Children, another global charity, is alleged to have been recruited by
HAMAS in 2014 to provide it with information on American aid workers. 5 These incidents highlight
the risks to charitable funding and aid projects in conflict prone environments. This article examines
the legal regulatory framework for Australian charities in circumstances of financing of terrorism
overseas.

Professor, School of Law, Faculty of Law Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong. The author is grateful to David
Knoll, Tim McCormack and Simon Norton for their helpful comments on the draft and to Blake Lloyd and Aiden Lerch for their
research assistance. The views expressed and any errors are those of the author alone.
1
Dept of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Canada, Currently Listed Entities (28 December 2016) Public Safety
Canada <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx>; Council of the European
Union,
Council
Decision
2016/1136
of
12
July
2016
EUR-Lex
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016D1136>;
UK
Home
Office,
Proscribed
Terrorist
Organisations
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/538297/20160715-Proscription-websiteupdate.pdf> 9; US Dept of State, Foreign Terrorist Organisations <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.
2
AFP, “Palestinian UN Worker Sentenced to 7 months for Aiding Hamas”, Times of Israel (4 January 2017)
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinian-un-worker-sentenced-to-7-months-for-aiding-hamas/>.
3
See text accompanying nn 34-55.
4
Terence McCoy, “The controversial UN agency that found rockets in its Gaza schools”, Washington Post (1 August 2014)
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/01/war-in-gaza-the-controversial-un-agency-that-foundrockets-in-its-schools/?utm_term=.5cccd7cc0188>.
5
AFP, “Save the Children probing claim employee recruited by HAMAS”, SBS News (9 August 2016)
<http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2016/08/09/save-children-probing-claim-employee-recruited-hamas>.
*
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CHARITIES IN AUSTRALIA

In the Charities Act 2013 (Cth), a charity is defined as an entity that is “not-for-profit”, and “all of the
purposes of which are charitable purposes that are for the public benefit”. 6 These purposes are listed
and include: health, education and social and public welfare. 7 Catch-all purposes also listed are
“purposes that are incidental or ancillary to” those charitable purposes. 8 These are elaborated upon as
“any other purpose beneficial to the general public that may be regarded as analogous or within the
spirit” of the previously listed purposes, and promoting law or policy or practice in furtherance of one
of the purposes listed. 9
An organisation cannot be a charity if it has any purposes that would disqualify it. 10 A disqualifying
purpose is one that promotes unlawful activities or promotes or opposes political parties or candidates
for political office. 11 Political violence is usually unlawful under the local legal systems where it occurs
(and sometimes also under Australian or other laws operating transnationally), 12 so promotion of such
a purpose would be a disqualifying activity.

Australian Charities Statistics

Australian charities have existed for over a century and a half. However, little statistical information
was gathered about them until recently. A great deal more information has become available since the
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) was established and commenced
operation on 3 December 2012. This is a statutory office acting independently as the sector regulator
and reporting directly to Parliament. It has functional support from the Australian Tax Office (the
national tax revenue agency) for its human resources and administrative work.
The ACNC registered 1,643 charities in 2013, its first year. In 2016, about 50 charities were registering
each month. By 2018, nearly 60,000 Australian charities were registered. 13 This is by no means the
majority of Australian charities and, when not-for-profit unincorporated associations, such as
neighbourhood sports clubs are included, those registered with the ACNC comprise perhaps only
10%. 14
In December 2015, the first annual charities report was published. The most recent report indicates that
charities in Australia spent over AU$122.8 billion pursuing charitable purposes, out of a total income
of $134.5 billion (the difference suggesting overhead costs). 15 About 75% of income devoted to
charitable purposes went to education and research (45.1%), health (25.2%), and development and
housing (7.8%). 16 The sector is dominated by major players. The largest 10% of charities received
89.5% of the sector’s income. About 40% of income came from government grants ($55 billion). 17
Faith-based charities were the largest single category of charity in Australia, more than four times the
size of the next largest category of activity. 18 The 2015 report on Australian charities involved overseas
indicated that approximately 15–17% of Australian charities overall reported being “involved overseas

Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s 5.
Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s 12(1).
8
Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s 5(b)(ii).
9
Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s 12(1) (k), (l) respectively, cover analogous purposes and relevant law or policy.
10
Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s 5(c).
11
Charities Act 2013 (Cth) s 11.
12
For example, acts of terrorism committed overseas are illegal under Australian law operating transnationally: Criminal Code
Act 1995 (Cth) Sch (Criminal Code) s 101.1(2).
13
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC), Background to the not-for-profit sector
<http://acnc.gov.au/ACNC/About_ACNC/Research/Background_NFP/ACNC/Edu/NFP_background.aspx>.
14
The Australian Institute of Criminology estimated in 2014 that the Australian not-for-profit sector, including unincorporated
associations, encompassed around 600,000 charities: Samantha Bricknell et al, “Money laundering and terrorism financing risks
to Australian non-profit organisations” (AIC research and public policy series No 114, 10 February 2014) 3.
15
ACNC, Australian Charities Report 2015 <http://www.csi.edu.au/media/Australian_Charities_Report_2015_Web_ND8DU2P.pdf>
11.
16
ACNC, n 15, 53.
17
ACNC, n 15, 52–54.
18
Penny Knight and David Gilchrist, Australian Charities 2013: The First Report on Charities Registered with the Australian
Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (Report for the ACNC, 2014) 27.
6
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in some way”. 19 Charities with a religious purpose appear more likely to be operating overseas. The
2015 report on Australia’s faith based charities indicated that 25% of charities with a religious purpose
have some international activity. 20

DIVERTING CHARITABLE FUNDS INTO POLITICAL VIOLENCE OVERSEAS

After the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, ratifications of the 1999
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism increased in number and
the financial war on terrorism was launched under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373,
which called for the freezing of terrorist assets and prohibited making funds, assets, resources or
financial services available to listed terrorists. 21 In October 2001, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which aims to combat money
laundering by organised crime, adopted eight Special Recommendations to detect, prevent and suppress
the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts. One additional recommendation that was adopted in 2003
marked nine Special Recommendations. The 40+9 Recommendations were then integrated, revised and
renumbered in 2012. One such recommendation concerns terrorism financing by charities and nonprofit organisations. It requires that FATF countries review the adequacy of their respective laws and
regulations that relate to such entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. 22
In February 2016, a terrorism financing risk assessment workshop for Thailand, Philippines and
Malaysia identified four major regional terrorism financing risks, one being the misuse of charitable
funds. 23 A regional risk assessment was conducted in 2017 for non-profit organisations that indicated
a growing concern over this sector, which was rated a medium-level risk. Indonesia faces the highest
risk, with 337,000 known charities, of which some have links to terrorist organisations. 24 Four
Indonesian charities have been listed by the UN Security Council for targeted counter-terrorism
financial sanctions. 25 Examples of charities around other parts of the world being subverted to finance
terrorism in other countries include the Holy Land Foundation in the United States, 26 ISNA-Islamic
Services in Canada 27 and INTERPAL in the United Kingdom. 28 Zakat or Islamic charitable giving is
particularly vulnerable to subversion, as social welfare and “jihadi resistance” merge in some recipient
organisations and can be indistinguishable to donors. 29
It is particularly difficult to ensure that development assistance provided to a foreign war zone does not
support fighting taking place there. The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
(AUSTRAC) published a report in 2014 concerning Australian terrorism financing, which stated that

Penny Knight and David Gilchrist, Australian Charities Overseas – a study supplementing the Australian Charities 2013
Report (2015) 4.
Penny Knight and David Gilchrist, Australia’s Faith Based Charities – a study supplementing the Australian Charities 2013
Report (2015) 19.
21
See, generally, Nicholas Ryder, The Financial War on Terrorism – A review of counterterrorist financing strategies since 2001
(Routledge 2015).
22
FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF
Recommendations
(November
2017)
<http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> 11.
23
Agus Santoso and Sylvia Laksmi, “Regional Terrorism Financing Framework: Southeast Asia and Australia” (2016) 8 Counter
Terrorist Trends and Analysis 21.
24
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Non-Profit Organisations and Terrorism Financing –
Regional Risk Assessment 2017 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/regional-not-profit-sector-risk-assessment-2017> 20.
25
AUSTRAC, n 24, 24.
26
US Federal Bureau of Investigation, No Cash for Terror: Conviction Returned in Holy Land Cases (25 November 2008)
<https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/november/hlf112508>.
27
Stewart Bell and Sean Craig, “Government Revokes Group’s Charity Status, Audit cites possible Funding of Pakistani
Militants”, Global News Canada (19 June 2017) <https://globalnews.ca/news/3606224/government-revokes-groups-charitystatus-audit-cites-pakistani-militants/>.
28
Alex Delmar-Morgan and Peter Oborne, “Why is the Muslim Charity Interpal being Blacklisted as a Terrorist Organisation”
The Telegraph (online) 26 November 2014 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11255294/Why-is-the-Muslim-charityInterpal-being-blacklisted-as-a-terrorist-organisation.html>.
29
See eg, the case of Hezbollah: Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah – The global footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown UP,
2013).
19
20
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“charities and not-for-profit organisations which operate in crises and war zones overseas are at risk of
being infiltrated and exploited by terrorist groups in these areas”. 30 In the 2016 regional risk assessment
of terrorism financing, discussed at the Second Southeast Asian Regional Counter-Terrorism Financing
Summit, it was reported that Australian not-for-profit organisations ranked as the second highest
national risk for terrorism financing. 31 In its report on money laundering and terrorism financing risks
in the Australian non-profit sector, the Australian Institute of Criminology noted that “the greatest risk
for legitimate charities appears to be what happens to funds once outside the organisation’s immediate
administrative jurisdiction”. 32 It observed, as an example, that HAMAS interchanges funds between
legitimate and illegitimate uses 33 and that known Australian cases of financing terrorism usually
involved complex networks of funds transfers.

Case of World Vision Australia

An embarrassment confronting World Vision Australia in August 2016 was disclosure by Israeli
authorities of alleged diversion of its charitable funds to HAMAS. The circumstances provide a case
study of shortcomings and opportunities for improvement in the Australian regulatory environment for
charities engaged in regions experiencing violent political conflict.
World Vision International is a California-based Christian evangelical charity. It has an worldwide
annual income of approximately US$2.7 billion, employing more than 44,000 people operating in 100
countries. 34 Almost 80% of its income is donated by private sources, including individuals, corporations
and foundations. 35 Governments (eg, Australia, EU, UK, US) and intergovernmental organisations (eg,
World Food Program) make up the rest. 36
World Vision Australia is Australia’s largest charitable group, drawing on the support of over 400,000
donors 37 and is by far Australia’s most successful international charity in terms of funds raised. 38 Its
2014/2015 financial year revenue was AU$424 million, a little over a sixth of the global parent
organisation, of which $266 million went to international and domestic programs. 39
World Vision International began working in Jerusalem – West Bank – Gaza in 1975. Funding for its
work there runs at about US$17.5 million per annum 40 where it has about 150 staff. 41 World Vision
Australia provides about 30% of World Vision’s funding in Gaza, US$4.815 million in the 2014/2015
financial year. 42 The Australian federal government recently gave about AU$5 million to World Vision
Australia across three years for projects in the Gaza Strip. 43
It is alleged by Israeli prosecutors that 60% of World Vision’s annual operational budget funding in
Gaza has been directed towards supporting HAMAS. 44 HAMAS does nor distinguish its military wing

AUSTRAC, Terrorism Financing in Australia 2014 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/publications> 16.
AUSTRAC, Regional Risk Assessment on Terrorism Financing 2016 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/regional-risk-assessmentterrorism-financing-2016> 24.
32
Bricknell et al, n 14, 26.
33
Bricknell et al, n 14, 10.
34
World Vision International, 2015 Annual Review (2016).
35
NGO Monitor, World Vision (21 September 2016) <http://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/world_vision_international/>.
36
NGO Monitor, n 35.
37
World Vision Australia, About Us <https://www.worldvision.com.au/about-us/faqs>.
38
Probono
Australia,
Australia’s
Biggest
Fundraisers
(4
March
2014)
<https://probonoaustralia.com.au/news/2014/03/australias-biggest-fundraisers/>.
39
World Vision Australia, Annual Report 2015 (2016) <https://www.worldvision.com.au/about-us/annual-reports> 72.
40
World
Vision
Jerusalem
–
West
Bank
–
Gaza,
Annual
Review
2014
(2015)
<http://www.wvi.org/sites/default/files/World%20Vision%20JWG_Annual%20Review%202014_English_Final.pdf> 36.
41
World Vision Jerusalem – West Bank – Gaza, n 40, 8.
42
World Vision Jerusalem – West Bank – Gaza, n 40, 36.
43
Sophie McNeil, “World Vision ‘Shocked’ by Israel Allegations Gaza Manager Diverted Charity Money to Hama”, ABC News
(5 August 2016) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-05/world-vision-boss-gaza-accused-by-israel-diverting-moneyhamas/7692594>.
44
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind the Headlines: Hamas exploitation of World Vision in Gaza to support terrorism (4
August 2016) <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/Behind-the-Headlines-Hamas-exploitation-of-World-Visionin-Gaza-to-support-terrorism-4-August-2016.aspx>.
30
31
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as a different organisation from its main body, 45 and as a whole has been listed as a terrorist organisation
by Canada, the European Union, United Kingdom and United States. 46 HAMAS’s military wing is a
listed terrorist organisation in Australia. 47
Mohammed El-Halabi is alleged by the Israeli prosecutor to have been recruited by HAMAS in the
early 2000s, planted in World Vision in 2005, rising to become its Director in Gaza, where he allegedly
controlled funds, equipment and aid packages. He made regular trips between Israel and Gaza and had
been under extended Israeli security surveillance. He was formally arrested at the Keren Shalom
Crossing Point on 15 June 2016. 48
He appeared in the Beersheba District Court in a civil prosecution for a closed hearing of 14 charges
on 5 August 2016 and for a public hearing on 13 January 2017, where he pled not guilty. 49 During
administrative detention, El-Halabi was alleged to have confessed to diverting annual cash transfers of
US$1.5 million to HAMAS, as part of a total of US$7.2 million annually in transferred value. 50 Once
in remand, he claimed to have been tortured and refused a plea bargain, resulting in charges under
treason reportedly being added. 51 The trial resumed on 2 February 2017 but little progress was reported
throughout that year as both sides engaged in procedural manoeuvres over contested disclosure of
confidential evidence sources and each changed legal teams. 52
The total value diverted to terror activities over El-Halabi’s time is said to be in the range of US$43
million. 53 There is much uncertainty over the figures, with World Vision contending that they are
inflated beyond possibility. 54 On 8 August, World Vision Australia claimed that World Vision
International’s cumulative operating budget for Gaza over the past decade was far lower, at $US22.5
million. 55 The statement also noted that El-Halabi had been the manager of World Vision’s Gaza
operations only since October 2014 and that before then he allegedly had the authority to approve
transactions only up to US$15,000 in the Gaza budget at a time. 56
The funds were allegedly directed to HAMAS, for the salaries of fighters in its al-Qassam Brigades,
payment for fortified infrastructure, military weapons and salaries and packages for officials. To
facilitate diversion of funds through ten years, fictitious projects were allegedly created, purporting to
help farmers, the disabled and fishermen. Methodologies included false registration of employees,
fictitious receipts and inflated invoices, favouring complicit tenderers and disguising warehouse
transfers. 57
In a 29 August letter handed to around 120 contractors at a meeting in Gaza, World Vision said that it
was impossible to pay them as its bank accounts in Jerusalem had been frozen by Israeli authorities and

Matthew Levitt, HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (YUP, 2006); Matthew Levitt, “Hamas from
Cradle to Grave” (2004) 11(Winter) Middle East Quarterly 3.
See n 1.
47
Criminal Code s 102; Australian National Security, Listed Terrorist Organisations: Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades
<https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/HamassIzzal-Dinal-QassamBrigades.aspx>.
48
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n 44.
49
Sophie McNeil, “Israel announces late charges against World Vision official after plea deal rejected” (12 January 2017) ABC
News Online <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-12/israel-announces-new-charges-against-world-vision-official/8177272>.
50
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n 44.
51
Sophie McNeil,” Israeli judge allows new charges in world vision manager accused of diverting millions to HAMAS” (13
January 2017) ABC News Online <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-13/israeli-judge-allows-new-charges-in-world-visionmanager-trial/8179950>.
52
Sophie McNeil, “World vision employee Mohammed El Halabi pleads not guilty to funding HAMAS in Gaza” ABC News
(3 February 2017) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-03/world-vision-employee-pleads-not-guilty-to-funding-hamas-ingaza/8238000 >.
53
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n 44. Anthony Klan, “Federal World Vision funding ‘went to Hamas’”, The Australian
(online), 28 November 2016 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/federal-world-vision-fundingwent-to-hamas/news-story/28127fd5f7ae2d55da57b54bf06dd96f>.
54
World Vision International, Update: Statement by World Vision International CEO in wake of staff arrest (8 August 2016)
<http://www.wvi.org/pressrelease/update-statement-world-vision-international-ceo-wake-staff-arrest>.
55
Isabel Kershner and Diaa Hadid, “Israel Charges Aid Group’s Gaza Branch Manager with Funnelling Funds to Hamas” New
York Times (online), 4 August 2016 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/world/middleeast/world-vision-hamas.html?_r=0>.
56
World Vision International, n 34.
57
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n 44.
45
46
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it was no longer able to transfer money to Gaza. 58 In August, the Australian Government suspended
further funding pending the outcome of an investigation. Up to €1.1 million had been transferred by
Germany to World Vision in Gaza since 2010 and the German Federal Development Ministry and
Foreign Affairs Ministry then suspended €3.6 million earmarked for World Vision projects in Gaza. 59
The UK Department for International Development funded World Vision indirectly 60 through the
Disasters Emergency Committee, and has stated it will not consider awarding grant money that would
go to World Vision until the current allegations have been investigated. 61
World Vision Australia is deeply engaged in Gaza and its relationship with a main local partner, the
Palestinian Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), extends over three decades. It has built
an extensive network of relationships with local government, organisations and recipients. It might lose
these relationships if it imposes strict supervisory measures that could alienate it from its local partners
and stakeholders. Additionally, the charity is perceived by many as politically partisan in its operations
in Jerusalem – West Bank – Gaza. For example, Tim Costello, then Executive Director of World Vision
Australia, in his defence of Mohammed El-Halabi, retorted by accusing Israel of holding children in
Gaza as the world’s largest prison. 62 Further evidence suggests that a millennial desire for Christian
authority over Jerusalem motivates some World Vision antagonism to Jewish sovereignty in
jurisdictions it describes collectively as the Holy Land 63 in a pattern that is fairly consistent over a
quarter century. 64 A positive exception is Project Rozana, which trains Palestinian health professionals
and treats critically ill children from the West Bank and Gaza at Hadassah Hospital in Israel. This
Australian-inspired initiative in 2013 engages St John’s Ambulance and World Vision to facilitate
treatment for Palestinians in the Israeli hospital. 65
The World Vision Australia travails concerning funding allegedly diverted to support HAMAS indicate
that it might be timely to reappraise oversight and risk management of Australian charitable operations
overseas in zones such as Gaza where operations are at relatively high risk of improper diversion into
armed conflict.

AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Australian charities are regulated under federal, State and Territory civil and criminal laws that regulate
charities in various ways, such as by criminalising fraud, but it is Commonwealth laws that have greater
relevance to larger incorporated charities and their operations overseas due to the engagement of federal
tax, corporations, financial transactions and counter-terrorism laws and the extraterritorial reach of
those laws. Thus, the focus of this article is on Commonwealth laws.

58
Nidal al-Mughrabi, “World Vision lays off contractors in Gaza after Israel allegations”, Reuters (9 September 2016)
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-gaza-worldvision-idUSKCN11F1RP.
59
Tovah Lazaroff and Benjamin Weinthal, “Germany, Australia suspend World Vision funding”, Jerusalem Post (7 August
2016)
<http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Germany-Australia-suspend-funding-for-World-Vision463434>.
60
The UK Dept for International Development has channelled £27 million for charitable work in Gaza through the Disasters
Emergency Committee, which will conduct its own internal audit: see DEC Gaza response receives strong review in emergency
phase (2 February 2015) <http://www.dec.org.uk/press-release/dec-gaza-response-receives-strong-review-for-emergencyphase>.
61
UK Dept for International Development, Letter from Secretary of State the Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, to Mr Simon Johnson, Chief
Executive, Jewish Leadership Council and Gillian Merron, Chief Executive, Board of Deputies of British Jews (23 August 2016)
<https://www.bod.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Priti-Patel-to-BoDJLC.pdf>.
62
McNeil, n 43, Video interview. There were no negative funding consequences for Palestinian local partners who named a
soccer field funded by World Vision Australia in a West Bank sporting complex after Abu Jihad, a PLO terrorist responsible for
dozens of murders in 2010: Cameron Stewart, The Australian, 27 March 2010. Similarly, in 2004 Costello called for Australia
to vote against Israel in the UN: Tim Costello, “For the children’s sake, tear down this wall!” The Age, 14 July 2004.
63
See World Vision Palestine Director, Thomas Getman, “A Response to Christian Zionist Exclusivism” (1999) 15(Spring)
Cornerstone 19: “Jerusalem is the spiritual home for 2 billion people … Only 15 million are Jewish. The better part of wisdom
would be for God’s chosen to share it or they will absolutely guarantee being proven the world’s rejected once again.”
64
In 1990, Phillip Hunt, then Executive Director, World Vision Australia, called for sanctions against Israel and the prevention
of Jewish immigration into Israel: see Tom Ballantyne, “Jewish council attacks World Vision’s stand on Israel” Sydney Morning
Herald,16 June 1990, 4.
65
Project Rozana, <http://www.projectrozana.org/>.
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Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission

World Vision Australia is a public corporation limited by guarantee 66 and registered since 1969 with
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and its predecessors. 67 It was annually audited
as required under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 68 Since its registration with the ACNC, it is instead
now audited as required under the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth)
(ACNC Act), 69 by an independent accounting firm, Grant-Thornton Audit. 70
The purposes of the ACNC are to: “maintain, protect and enhance public trust and confidence in the
sector through increased accountability and transparency; support and sustain a robust, vibrant,
independent and innovative not-for-profit sector; and to promote the reduction of unnecessary
regulatory obligations on the sector”. 71 To these ends, the ACNC emphasises transparency, maintaining
a free searchable online public register of charities that sets out their “purposes, activities, financial
information, responsible persons and people they work to benefit”. 72 It also seeks to provide charities
with guidance, education and advice and to reduce red tape for them.
Registration with the ACNC is voluntary. However, in order to qualify for tax concessions in the form
of deductible donations under Australian tax laws, registration is a prerequisite for certain classes of
charities, including overseas aid funds. 73 Not all charities have tax deductible status. 74 World Vision
Australia registered with the ACNC in 2014, with three stated charitable purposes: advancing social or
public welfare, advancing religion, and promoting or protecting human rights. 75
The ACNC Act requires, inter alia, that charities meet five minimum governance standards concerning
responsible conduct. 76 Charities are to maintain records to demonstrate their proper governance, but
need produce them only if asked to do so. 77 The ACNC Act sets out record keeping standards for
charities to comply with 78 and the ACNC has monitoring powers to gather information on and to
monitor charities. 79 Whether a charity is audited typically depends on its size but not necessarily on its
overseas activities 80 and there are no special requirements for charities with operations overseas. 81 To
impose additional requirements on charities that operate overseas, external conduct standards are
referred to in the ACNC Act but no such standards have yet been specified in regulations. 82 The ACNC’s
enforcement powers include the ability to give directions, accept enforceable undertakings, issue

ACNC Register, World Vision Australia <https://www.acnc.gov.au/RN52B75Q?ID=8DD83DD0-F1AF-4168-8973624339B8C744&noleft=1>.
67
Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Company Summary – World Vision Australia
<https://connectonline.asic.gov.au/RegistrySearch/faces/landing/SearchRegisters.jspx?_afrLoop=3003402451040482&_afrWi
ndowMode=0&_adf.ctrl-state=u8kwy2c9_4>.
68
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 301.
69
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) Subdiv 60-C.
70
World Vision Australia, n 39, 83.
71
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) ss 15.5–15.10.
72
ACNC,
Regulatory
Approach
Statement
<https://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/About_ACNC/Regulatory_app/RegApp_St2013/ACNC/Publications/Reg_App/RegAppr_Po
wers.aspx?hkey=e8deb00c-f626-4813-8f50-1cf1ef8f0a6b>.
73
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 30.80, 30.85.
74
To be tax deductible, an organisation must have deductible gift recipient status which is received by being endorsed by the
ATO, or by being listed in law by Parliament: Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Subdiv 30-B, s 30-17.
75
ACNC Register, n 66.
76
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 45.5.
77
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 55.5.
78
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) Ch 3 Pt 3-2.
79
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) Ch 4 Pt 4-1.
80
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 60.1. See also ACNC, Review and audit of financial
reports <http://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Manage/Reporting/ReviewAudit/ACNC/Report/ReviewAudit.aspx>.
81
CPA Australia, Charities: A guide to financial reporting and assurance requirements (3rd ed, 2013)
<https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/~/media/Corporate/AllFiles/Document/professional-resources/auditing-assurance/charitiesguide-report.pdf>.
82
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 50.10. The ACNC and AUSTRAC 2017 Risk
Assessment for Australian charities and non-profit organisations noted that an appropriate regulatory action to fill lacuna is under
consideration.
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directions, obtain injunctions, suspend or remove responsible persons or entities, or apply penalty
notices. 83
The ACNC regulatory approach is premised upon active self-regulation by charities themselves, to
minimise government regulatory burdening. This is notionally a risk-based approach that takes into
consideration the different circumstances of individual charities. 84 It focuses on compliance with
governance standards and this extends to counter-terrorism financing. To this end, the ACNC has
produced guidelines on “Safeguarding Your Organisations against Terrorism: Guidance for Non-Profit
Organisations” and a list for charities to check off. 85
However, the audits in Australia of financial throughputs are not designed to detect the disguised nature
of the recipients of goods and funds and the checklist might be regarded as simplistic. Ultimately, the
ACNC is not designed to ensure the integrity of complex offshore charitable ventures and regulatory
reform will be necessary to enable it to do so. However, it is a relatively new and rapidly developing
agency that has engaged energetically in continued improvement in its role.

Australian Transaction Reporting and Analysis Centre

Provisions in relation to the financing of terrorism are set out in the Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act). They require entities that provide
designated financial services to register with AUSTRAC. 86 The most common form of designated
services are financial transfer services. 87 Remittance service providers are also to register with
AUSTRAC, the national financial intelligence agency. 88 Australian charities are not designated as
funds transfer services. Therefore, they are not required to register with or report to AUSTRAC, nor
subject to the AML/CTF Act due diligence obligations. The vast majority, if not all, of Australian
charities operating overseas would typically use a third party, such as a bank or remittance provider, to
transfer funds. AUSTRAC therefore would obtain data about transfers overseas from that third party.
AUSTRAC has listed financial contributions by charities as one of the three most common ways of
financing terrorism in and from Australia. 89 In 2015, an FATF regional mutual evaluation report
concluded that Australia was not compliant with Special Recommendation 8 on terrorism financing by
non-profit organisations. 90 This was because it had not conducted the required national review of the
adequacy of laws and regulations and of outreach and supervision to suppress terrorism financing in
the charity sector. Consequently, Australia’s first risk assessment on countering terror financing
through charities and non-profit organisations was released in August 2017 by the ACNC, together with
AUSTRAC.
The 2017 national report adopts a standard risk framework (threat x vulnerability x consequences) to
measure not-for-profit sector and organisational vulnerability, so as to produce key risk indicators. It
identifies “significant links” between Australian charities and organised crime giving rise to a
“medium” risk. Between 2012 and 2016, there were 28 “suspicious matter reports” related to charitable
financing of terrorism received by AUSTRAC worth $5.6 million. 91 These involved charities that

Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) Pt 4-2. Some of these powers (such as the power to
remove a responsible entity) can only be applied to a federally regulated entity (s 100.5) which is a constitutional corporation or
an entity connected to a territory (s 205.15).
84
ACNC, n 72.
85
ACNC,
Checklist:
protecting
your
charity
against
the
risk
of
terrorism
financing
83

<http://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Manage/Protect/Checklist__protect_against_the_risk_of_terrorism_financing/ACNC/Edu/ChecklistTF.aspx>.

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) s 6.
AUSTRAC, Enrolment and Registration (28 June 2016) <http://www.austrac.gov.au/businesses/enrolment-and-remitterregistration/enrolment-and-registration>.
88
AUSTRAC, Remitter Registration Requirements (16 November 2016) <http://www.austrac.gov.au/chapter-5-remitterregistration-requirements>.
89
AUSTRAC, Typologies and Case Studies Report 2010 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/typologies-and-case-studies-report-2010>
8.
90
FATF, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures Report: Australia Mutual Evaluation Report 2015
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf> 16.
91
AUSTRAC,
Australia’s
Non-Profit
Organisation
Sector
–
National
Risk
Assessment
2017
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/npo-risk-assessment-FINAL-web.pdf> 10.
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demonstrated a sectoral capacity to quickly raise and camouflage the movement of large amounts of
funds offshore to support individuals or groups engaged in foreign conflict. 92
Entities registered with AUSTRAC are expected to report and to exercise due diligence to know their
customers’ identities and integrity in order to manage and minimise the risk of money-laundering and
terrorism financing. 93 To help identify money laundering and terrorism financing, AUSTRAC itself
conducts data matching with the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and Australian Federal
Police, and on an ad hoc basis with the ACNC. Its methodology concerning terrorism financing by
Australian donors focuses on Australian community ties to terrorist organisations overseas.
AUSTRAC has conducted at least five investigations into terrorism financing but has not publicly
reported investigation of an Australian charity. As yet, it has not developed a typology model or a
methodology to address Australian charitable activities that might become compromised or corrupted
overseas and divert Australian charitable resources into terrorism, but the 2017 national risk assessment
might catalyse new developments.
Currently, the ACNC cannot access terrorism financing information directly from AUSTRAC due to
the confidentiality provisions in the AML/CTF Act. Amendment of the AML/CTF Act to authorise the
ACNC as a designated agency for the purposes of sharing information has been suggested and is
proposed for the Commonwealth Parliament. 94 As noted below, regulatory supervision of charities in
Canada has the advantage of informational inputs from national criminal and security intelligence
agencies, which could be replicated in Australia to improve the efficient detention of terrorist financing.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

The main pillar of the Australian aid program to the Middle East has been the Australian Middle East
NGO Cooperation Agreement (AMENCA). AMENCA 3 is the current six-year program. 95 The
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) describes the AMENCA as enabling aid
to be delivered by it through Australian NGOs implementing in partnership with local consortia. This
Middle East program focuses exclusively on Palestinian Territories. 96 The four Australian
implementing NGOs are: Action Aid Australia (in partnership with local Palestinian NGO Asala),
APHEDA (with Ma’an), CARE (with Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, and others), and World
Vision Australia (with UAWC). 97
Following allegations in 2012 from an Israeli NGO, Shurat Hadin, concerning UAWC leadership
personnel overlap with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, another internationally listed
terrorist organisation, 98 DFAT introduced a counter-terrorism due diligence framework in 2013 and
conducted an AMENCA 2 Risk Management Review, published in May 2014. The risk management
review focused on local Palestinian partners and found that local partner risk management includes:
Australian NGO commitments to due diligence requirements; annual spot checks by DFAT staff;
annual risk and counter-terrorism management reporting by the Australian NGOs and the DFAT
AMENCA program manager; and an independent risk assessment as part of a mid-term review. 99

AUSTRAC, n 91, 10.
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) Pt 2: Identification.
94
Paula Chadderton and Simon Norton, “Charities, non-profits: how to cut the risk of terror financing” The Australian (22 August
2016)
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/charities-nonprofits-how-to-cut-the-risk-of-terror-financing/newsstory/9085352b68a24c8aa6fead425960147d>.
95
Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Development Assistance in the Palestinian Territories
<http://dfat.gov.au/geo/palestinian-territories/development-assistance/Pages/development-assistance-in-palestinianterritories.aspx>: AMENCA 1 (2005–2008); AMENCA 2 (2009–2015) ($35,460,225); AMENCA 3 (2016–2022) ($43 m).
96
DFAT, Aid Program Performance Report 2015–16: Palestinian Territorie” (September 2016).
97
Scott Rankin, AMENCA 2 Program Review – project summary 2016 <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/businessopportunities/tenders/Pages/amenca-palestinian-territories-connecting-to-markets-progam.aspx>.
98
Yaakov Lapin, “Shurat HaDin: We’ve been warning about a World Vision for years” Jerusalem Post (8 May 2016); DFAT,
FOI disclosure log – Australian aid related requests <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/corporate/freedom-of-information/Pages/foidisclosure-log-australian-aid-related-requests.aspx>.
99
Belinda Lucas, Risk Management Review of the Australia-Middle East NGO Cooperation Agreement, final report (May 2014)
<http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/business-opportunities/tenders/Pages/amenca-palestinian-territories-connecting-to-marketsprogam.aspx>.
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Within the due diligence requirements, local Palestinian partner organisations are vetted by Australian
NGOs, which check the local partner organisation name against various lists of terrorist organisations 100
and their key personnel are vetted using similar lists. 101
Australian NGOs and their staff (such as Mohammed El-Halabi) do not require vetting under
AMENCA. Instead, they are collectively covered under DFAT’s Australian NGO accreditation
process. 102 Prerequisites for accreditation include being a signatory to the Australian Council for
International Development (ACFID) Code of Conduct for Non-Government Development
Organisations and signing DFAT contracts requiring compliance with Australian counter-terrorism
laws, as well as committing to vet key overseas partner organisations and personnel, document risk
management, and report annual counter-terrorism due diligence. 103
The 2014 AMENCA Risk Management Review report lacked critical analysis, although descriptive
and informative. For example, it did not address the lack of ongoing presence of Australia-based staff,
lack of vetting of Australian implementing NGO locally appointed staff, lack of whistle blower
protections for locally based staff under local partner peer pressure, and lack of calibration of risk
management to correspond with operational circumstances. On comparing the DFAT counter-terrorism
due diligence framework for government funded humanitarian assistance with that of the United States,
discussed below, it is apparent that the Australian framework is superficial, under-resourced and
ineffectual. 104

World Vision Australia Self-regulation

World Vision Australia is signatory to several voluntary self-regulatory codes. These include the
ACFID “Code of Conduct” and the Australian Institute of Director’s “Good Governance Principles and
Guidance for Not-For-Profit Organisations”. World Vision Australia states that it has an “independent
body outside World Vision that interviews and does security checks” and that it is subject to regular
internal audits. It has commissioned its own forensic audit to be conducted by external experts to clarify
whether or how funds were diverted to HAMAS. 105 A member of the Board of Directors of World
Vision Australia, Prof Tim McCormack, who is respected internationally, has conducted an initial
internal assessment of the organisation’s position, working with World Vision International to ensure
that the external forensic audit is conducted thoroughly and rigorously. Therefore, it can be hoped that
the review will lead to improvements in mechanisms for due diligence in implementation of
government and voluntary codes. 106

Civil Litigation

Charities and their trustees may be liable for injury or loss of life caused by harmful acts of, or funded
by, their employees in connection with their work. The civil liability lies in tort law actions brought by

100
By using Bridget/ Watchdog plus, DFAT, and Attorney General’s Dept lists, and by using internet search engines to check
the organisation name for current or previous affiliations with such organisations: Lucas, n 99.
101
Board members of partner NGOs, senior executive staff of partner NGOs, financial staff of partner NGOs.
102
DFAT, Australian NGO accreditation guidance manual (October 2016) 16.
103
In addition, Australian implementing NGOs must comply with the DFAT Overseas Aid Gift Deduction Scheme (OAGDS) in
order to receive tax deductible donations for overseas operations. The OAGDS guidelines are principally about charity
registration and conformance to ACNC governance standards and not especially to overseas due diligence against terrorism:
DFAT, OAGDS Guidelines <https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/oagds-guidelines.pdf>.
104
Beyond the DFAT Middle East program, similar problems arise in other regions, such as South East Asia, eg, the Australian
Government paid Habitat for Humanity $12.7 million for a development assistance project to build classrooms, science
laboratories and school libraries in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines during a 6-year
program, 2012- 2017. Habitat for Humanity subcontracted the project to Alhayam Sultana Construction (belonging to members
of the Maute family clan) even after it had publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2014. The Maute clan brothers
responsible for the 2017 siege of Marawi city may have received millions of dollars through the subcontracting: see Amanda
Hodge,
“AusAID
cash
went
to
Marawi
Terrorist”
The
Australian,
11
November
2017
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/ausaid-cash-went-to-marawi-terrorist/newsstory/69136cb9d46649d7a2c069fa308ab45a>.
105
World Vision International, n 34.
106
World Vision Australia is understandably reticent to pre-empt the results of its own, the DFAT or Israeli inquiries and did not
respond to the author’s requests for information concerning its internal oversight.
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victims. 107 However, tort claims are governed primarily by Australian State and Territory tort laws that
are unlikely to succeed. They require proofs of a duty of care, and of causation and foreseeability of
damage, which are beset with difficulties in these indirect circumstances of third party financing of
terrorist acts. As will be seen below, the United States has introduced statutory reforms that enable
victims of terrorist acts to claim damages from terrorism sponsors. The Australian Government instead
provides direct State compensation payments to some victims of officially declared terrorist acts. 108
Other forms of civil claim might seek restitution for the value of donations misappropriated contrary to
the terms of the charitable purposes for which the donations were given. 109 These forms of legal action
also have little likelihood of success. The charity has no contract with, fiduciary duty to, or unjust
enrichment from the donor. Claims for damages based on fraud would require proof of intent to defraud
on the part of the charity, which is implausible in circumstances of failures in diligent management,
which would form the majority of charity cases.

Criminal Law Enforcement

Criminal laws most relevant to the subversion of charitable funding into terrorism are set out in the
Commonwealth Criminal Code counter-terrorism provisions. They implement a treaty obligation to
prevent and punish the “provision or collection of funds with the intentional knowledge that they are to
be used, in full or in part, to carry out a terrorist attack”. 110 The Criminal Code makes it an offence to
finance acts of terror. 111 It provides:
103.1(1) A person commits an offence if:
(a) the person provides or collects funds; and
(b) the person is reckless as to whether the funds will be used to facilitate or engage in a
terrorist act. 112

Section 103.2 similarly proscribes funding a terrorist. Appropriate to an era of globalised electronic
transactions, financing is an offence also if it occurs overseas. 113 Culpability of persons for this offence
requires criminal intent but the state of mind need not be one of deliberate intent, as the mens rea or
fault component is met if the state of mind was reckless. The Criminal Code defines recklessness as: 114
5.4(2) A person is reckless with respect to a result if:
(a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result will occur; and
(b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
(3) The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact.

Although recklessness is a lower threshold for criminal intention than deliberate intent, the factual
evidence requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the awareness of substantial risk. The substantial
risk component itself is an assessment of probability, and the unjustifiability component is an
assessment of reasonableness. This combination of factors is complex and difficult.
First, an Australian prosecutor would need to consider whether the probability of the funds being
diverted into terrorist acts was a substantial risk (under s 103.1(b)). Given the Gaza operational

Charity Commission for England and Wales (Charity Commission), Vicarious Liability of a Charity or Its Trustees (23 May
2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vicarious-liability-of-a-charity-or-its-trustees>.
108
Dept
of
Human
Services,
Australian
Victim
of
Terrorism
Overseas
Payment
<https://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/australian-victim-terrorism-overseas-payment>.
109
See, generally Wayne Covell, Keith Lupton and Jay Forder, Principles of Remedies (Lexis Nexis, 2015).
110
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 10 January 2000, 2178
UNTS 197 (entered into force 10 April 2002) Art 2.
111
Criminal Code, s 103.1 addresses financing of terrorism in the form of a terrorist act; s 103.2 addresses financing of a terrorist.
These provisions were introduced in 2005 to address FATF compliance concerns over Australia’s implementation of the FATF
Special Recommendations flowing from the 2005 compliance evaluation; s 102.6 deals with financing terrorist organisations and
was already in place from 2002. Confusion caused by the duplicative nature of the provisions, particularly ss 103.1, 103.2, has
been critiqued elsewhere (see, eg Bret Walker, Annual Report (Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, 7 November
2013) 76.
112
Intention is the fault element for the conduct described in s 103.1(1). See s 5.6(1).
113
Criminal Code s 103.3; the Attorney-General’s consent to prosecute is required if the alleged offence occurred entirely outside
Australia (s 15.4).
114
Criminal Code s 5.4.
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environment and poor oversight, it seems that it can be objectively asserted that a substantial risk was
present. Second, a prosecutor would need to consider whether individual officials of World Vision
Australia were beyond reasonable doubt themselves subjectively aware of the substantial risk that their
funding would be diverted (under s 5.4(2)(a)). This would require an investigation of the awareness of
individual officials of World Vision Australia of the unreliability of oversight mechanisms they
employed to prevent diversion of funds. On the evidence available at this stage, it is unsure whether
World Vision awareness of the unreliability of oversight mechanisms could be proved. If that
unreliability was well known even in DFAT, then complicity of government officials might be implied
too.
Finally, to determine whether it was unjustifiable to take the substantial risk requires an assessment of
the reasonableness (under s 5.4(2)(b)) of providing aid in circumstances that will ameliorate the
suffering of Gazan residents, while at the same time prolonging HAMAS rule and suffering brought
through its waging perpetual war and its repression of Gaza’s populace. In light of the mixed
consequences, a prosecutor might reasonably assert that the risk was unjustifiable.
Despite evidence of Australian funding of terrorist acts, 115 there has not been a successful prosecution
under s 103 of the Criminal Code on criminal funding of terrorist acts since the legislation was
introduced over a dozen years ago. 116 Two cases in Victoria have, however, considered crimes under
s 102 concerning funding of terrorist organisations.
In the more recent case, R v Vinayagamoorthy, 117 two defendants collected funds in Australia from the
Tamil Community and made the funds available to the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a terrorist
organisation proscribed under United Nations sanctions. They pleaded guilty to counts under s 21 of
the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), which provides that it is an offence to make an asset
available to a proscribed person or entity. This provision is a strict liability offence, 118 and therefore it
is simpler to use to gain a conviction, as any knowledge or recklessness on the part of the defendant
that the entity is a terrorist organisation need not be considered.
In R v Benbrika 119 the Supreme Court of Victoria considered the attempted financing of terrorism,
among numerous terrorism charges against seven defendants. The second, fourth and fifth defendants
were charged with attempting intentionally to make funds available to a terrorist organisation, knowing
that it was a terrorist organisation, in breach of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 11.1(1) concerning
attempt and s 102.6(1) on funding a terrorist organisation. They had stolen two cars and intended to
strip them and sell their parts to fund their group’s terrorist activities. The jury found the three
defendants guilty of attempted funding of a terrorist organisation. The prosecutions for this offence
were relatively simple, as the defendants were attempting to fund their own group’s terrorist activities
and, therefore, it was easily proven that they had actual knowledge that they were intentionally funding
a terrorist organisation.
These are the only two cases that have prosecuted the financing of terrorism in Australia and both
concerned offences of intentional funding of a terrorist organisation. 120 Neither concerned funding of a
terrorist act or person under s 103 of the Criminal Code, which has the sole provision on reckless
funding. Nevertheless, terrorism funding through charities, identified as Australia’s second highest
terrorism financing risk, occurs through reckless administration (eg, the World Vision case) as well as

For example Dar al Quran wa Sunnah, a charity in Sydney to raise money for Syrian refugees, is suspected of sending overseas
$27 million in Commonwealth child care benefits and rebates, used in part for terrorism financing: Lisa Main and Suzanne
Dredge, “Islamic State: Member of Australian Charity Charged with Raising Funds for Jihadists and Recruiting for IS” ABC
News (3 July 2015).
116
The two convictions for terrorism financing in Australia did not involve charitable organisations or recklessness: see R v
Vinayagamoorthy [2010] VSC 148; R v Benbrika (2009) 222 FLR 433; [2009] VSC 21.
117
R v Vinayagamoorthy [2010] VSC 148.
118
Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) s 21(2).
119
R v Benbrika (2009) 222 FLR 433; [2009] VSC 21.
120
It is likely that charges pending against a woman recently arrested for electronically transferring $30,000 to the Islamic State
terrorist organisation will be brought under s 102 also, rather than s 103: Rachel Clun, “Sydney Woman Charged with Financing
Islamic State”, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 23 January 2018 <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/sydney-woman-arrested-overterror-financing-20180123-h0mphu.html>.
115
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by intent. Unfortunately, though, prosecution for recklessly funding a terrorist act or person seems to
confront impossible hurdles under s 103. It follows that a reconsideration of whether the s 103 is
workable is appropriate.

SELECTED COMPARABLE JURISDICTIONS

Other common law countries also face challenges in preventing the diversion of charitable funds into
political violence overseas. Have alternative models been identified by them that provide charities with
credible regulation and disincentives within their jurisdictions? The following survey identifies features
in jurisdictions with similar legal frameworks regulating charities in Canada, England and Wales and
the United States that might provide lessons for Australia. The legal frameworks were, in each case,
established to address misuse of funds or other abuses of responsibilities by charities.

Canada

In Canada, a Charities Directorate was established in 1967 within the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA),
which is the national tax collection office. Charities must file annual reports and a list of any
international partner organisation that has been provided funds, in disclosures that are publically
available on the CRA website. 121 Canadian charities that transfer funds to other organisations for
international projects must also ensure that those organisations’ work adheres to the same guidelines
for charitable activities that they themselves must follow. 122
The Charities Registration (Security Information) Act 2001 (Can) 123 establishes the following test for
financing of terrorism: are there reasonable grounds to believe, based on criminal and security
intelligence reports, that an organisation makes its resources available, either directly or indirectly: to
a terrorist group that is a listed entity under the Criminal Code, or to any other organisation engaged in
terrorist activities or in activities that support terrorist activities? The Minister of National Revenue and
the Minister of Public Safety each review the evidence and sign a certificate if they believe the test has
been met. The certificate is then referred automatically to a judge of the Federal Court to determine the
reasonableness of the ministers’ decision. The judge prepares a summary of the security and criminal
intelligence reports, which is given to the affected organisation. The organisation can then appear before
the judge to argue against the certificate. If the judge upholds the ministers’ decision, the organisation
is barred from obtaining registration as a charity, or if already registered, it loses its registration. The
bar to registration lasts for seven years. However, an organisation can ask ministers to reconsider its
case at an earlier point if there has been a material change in circumstances. 124
In a July 2015 parliamentary report authored by the Standing Senate Committee on National Security
and Defence, the CRA confirmed that eight registered charities had had their status revoked as a result
of links to terrorism. 125 The Committee raised concerns about the length of time investigations can take,
and the fact that there appears to be no individual liability in Canadian law for directors and staff of
charities linked to terrorism. 126
The Islamic Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (IRFAN) had its charity registration revoked by
the CRA on April 9, 2011 based in part on CRA’s findings that IRFAN-Canada provided support to
HAMAS. CRA findings indicate that IRFAN-Canada provided over $14.6 million in resources to
operating partners that were run by officials of HAMAS, openly supported and provided funding to

The full return provided by the charity can be viewed, including a summary of activities overseas if applicable. Guidance for
charities operating overseas is also provided by Canada Revenue Agency, Canadian registered charities carrying out activites
outside Canada (8 July 2010) <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/plcy/cgd/tsd-cnd-eng.html>.
122
Canadian Committee for the Tel Aviv Foundation v Canada 2002 FCA 72; Canadian Magen David Adom for Israel v Canada
(Minister of National Revenue) 2002 FCA 323; Bayit Lepletot v Canada (Minister of National Revenue) 2006 FCA 128.
123
Charities Registration (Security Information) Act 2001, SC 2001, c 41, s 113.
124
Charities Registration (Security Information) Act 2001, SC 2001, c 41, s 113.
125
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Countering the Terrorist Threat in Canada: An Interim Report (2015)
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/412/secd/rep/rep18jul15-e.pdf> 9.
126
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, n 125, 9.
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HAMAS, or to entities that were listed by various jurisdictions because of their support for HAMAS or
other terrorist entities. 127
Like Australia, the Canadian Government inserts a standard obligation to comply with counterterrorism laws in development aid contracts with Canadian NGOs, which are first tier implementing
partners, and requires that they pass on similar clauses to second tier local partner NGOs and
community-based organisations. However, Canadian governmental officials also directly check lists of
names of development aid subcontracted organisations and key personnel against terrorist lists. 128 This
process enables the engagement of Canadian national security intelligence in a way that is not available
to Australian NGOs, which are merely using checklists and open internet searches.
As at July 2015, there had been only a single prosecution for a terrorism financing offence not coupled
with other terrorism charges in Canada, 129 although increased disclosures by the Financial Transactions
and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada to intelligence and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may
see an increase in future. 130

England and Wales

The Charity Commission for England and Wales was originally established in 1853 and currently
operates under the Charities Act 2011 (UK). It reports directly to Parliament and is the veteran model
for independent statutory charities commissions. Registration is mandatory for charities with an income
of over £5,000. 131
The Charities Commission has published a range of guidance against charitable engagement in terrorist
activity. These include regulatory guidance on obligations under terrorism legislation, 132 operational
guidance on the Charity Commission’s role in possible terrorist cases, 133 a “Compliance Toolkit” on
charities and terrorism, 134 and on “Protecting charities from abuse for extremist purposes”, 135 and it has
also published a policy paper on its counter-terrorism work. 136 Significant for suppression of support
of terrorism overseas, it has also developed a “compliance toolkit” for working with international
partners, which is based on due diligence in ensuring the integrity of partners and beneficiaries, with
the stringency of integrity assurance obligations corresponding to a risk assessment of the
circumstances. 137 The Charity Commission’s suite of guidance to counter the charitable financing of
terrorism is currently further advanced than that of the ACNC.
The Commission has powers to ensure compliance and accountability by addressing complaints about
the way a charity is run. These are concerns about a charity not doing what it claims to do, losing
money, harming people, being used for personal profit or gain, or being involved in illegal activity. 138

127
Canada Revenue Agency, Revoked Canadian charity listed under the Criminal Code as terrorist entity (29 April 2014)
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/chrts-gvng/chrts/whtsnw/trrrst-ntty-eng.html>.
128
In contrast, Australia requires implementing Australian NGOs to conduct their own vetting, although it imposes quality
assurance checks on the vetting: Lucas n 99, 11.
129
R v Thambaithurai 2011 BCCA 137. The accused pled guilty to supplying financial services knowing they would benefit the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a listed organisation under Criminal Code (Can).
130
Stewart Bell, “Canada is seeing a spike in behind-the-scenes funding for terrorists, finance minister’s office says” National
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Complaints about fundraising 139 and advertising 140 are directed elsewhere. It can impose individualised
conditions of operation, prescribe or proscribe certain staff or directors, suspend funding, negate
contracts, and so on. 141 Using its enforcement powers, the Commission conducts inquiries and a full
list of inquiries is set out on its website. 142
It has conducted one inquiry into possible terrorism financing, the result of which was released after a
criminal conviction had been secured in separate proceedings. 143 Meanwhile, it had frozen bank
accounts, confiscated funds and donated them to other charities, and disqualified the prosecuted
individual from being a trustee of a charity. 144 The Crown Prosecution Service charged 36 people and
convicted 11 for terrorism financing between 2000 and 2010 under the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK) (as
amended) 145 and has since achieved further convictions. 146
The Charities Commission of England and Wales has a proactive role as regulator, including providing
information to liquidators to assist recovery of funds from staff of charities who misappropriated
funds. 147 It has a dedicated secondee to the National Terrorist Investigation Unit based at the
Metropolitan Police and information sharing gateways with other authorities for the investigation of
terrorism. 148 The Charities Commission appears to have powers to respond to complaints and to
enforce, that are more extensive than the ACNC, but its effective use of those powers is questioned. 149
Concerns have been raised also over a lack of robust oversight to prevent terrorism financing through
public funds disbursed by the UK Department for International Development. 150

United States

The US Department of Treasury has found that approximately 20% of funding for acts of terrorism
prosecuted in the United States has come from charitable organisations. 151 The risk of funding terrorism
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is particularly high for organisations based in or operating in high risk jurisdictions where terrorist
groups are most active. 152
The Department of Treasury obliges tax-exempt organisations to file returns with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and to disclose matters, such as the amount of donations. 153 Charities are to disclose their
controls surrounding overseas activities and to detail expenditures by region and partner
organisation. 154 The Department of Treasury has also published voluntary best practice guidelines
designed to facilitate compliance with US laws. These guidelines propose that US charities collect at
least certain basic information on grantees, and conduct basic vetting of grantees and of their own key
employees. 155 These guidelines are complemented by responses from Treasury to comments received
on the guidelines during public consultations. 156 In contrast, AMENCA does not require similar vetting
of Australian charity employees and World Vision has not been required to disclose details of its due
diligence practices.
Beyond guidance, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (US), Treasury has powers
to designate charities that provide assistance to terrorist networks. 157 For each designation, Treasury
prepares an evidentiary “package” to be reviewed by the Departments of Treasury, State and Justice to
determine if there is a reasonable basis to believe the charity meets the requirements for designation.
When an entity has been designated, notice of the designation is published on the national List of
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons containing a public statement with reasons for
designation. 158 The charity loses its tax-exempt status, 159 and the IRS may prosecute those that have
concealed their affiliation with a designated foreign terrorist organisation terrorist by filing false tax
forms. 160 All US persons subject to US jurisdiction then have an obligation to identify and block the
property of the designated entity and instances must be reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) requires that all organisations being awarded
a grant or contract by USAID certify that they do not provide material support for terrorism. In
accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, before a grant or contract is given, USAID also
makes a “Responsibility Determination”. 161 In 2007, the USAID updated Mission Order 21 on counterterrorism measures. 162 This sets out its vetting procedures for non-US recipient organisations and their
key personnel, as well as for individual recipients (of sums over US$1,000). Information for vetting is
collected by USAID’s NGO partners and submitted to USAID’s Program Support Unit where the
information is verified and sent to a USAID Vetting Centre in Washington. New vetting is required
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whenever there is a change in an organisation’s key individuals. USAID has three full-time staff that
manage the vetting processes in its local Program Support Office in Jerusalem. USAID also undertakes
annual financial audits on 100% of its prime partners and significant sub-awardees. It recognises that
there is significant administrative burden required by its partners to comply with its requirements and
allows those costs to be included in the contract. 163 Mission Order 21 stands in contrast with more
superficial Australian regulatory oversight, which does not prescribe DFAT vetting procedures for local
partners.
In the United States, civil litigation can be brought by donors against charities for fraudulent
misrepresentation or misuse of funds. 164 Separately, the victims of terrorist acts overseas also can sue
charities that fund terrorist acts for the damage they cause. Liability lies in tort law in the jurisdiction
of each State, as has been demonstrated by awards of damages against funders for suffering caused to
victims. 165 In addition, federal statutes specify that liability can be imposed for loss caused by terrorist
acts overseas 166 and court judgements confirm that liability lies also against the funders. 167 In 2008, the
appellate court in Boim v Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development 168 upheld the civil liability
of officers of a US registered charity for financing terrorism by providing money to HAMAS.As noted
above, Australian practice is instead to provide victims with governmental compensation.
A series of high profile criminal cases prosecuting material support for terrorism also feature on the US
legal landscape. Congress has enacted laws that criminalise such material support, including by the
provision of drug proceeds, 169 and by conduct in violation of executive orders prohibiting transactions
with terrorist organisations. 170 Following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the
US Department of Justice brought a series of prosecutions against charities and their responsible
officers, including the Benevolence International Foundation, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development, Islamic American Relief Agency, Child Foundation, Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation,
and Care International. 171 The Holy Land Foundation case is particularly relevant to the current
circumstances of World Vision Australia, as it involved diversion of funds to HAMAS. Although the
Holy Land Foundation specified that its donations were for welfare purposes, the element of reckless
knowledge was proved because HAMAS was outside the control of the charity and was widely known
to commit terrorist acts, thereby demonstrating a substantial probability of the charity’s knowledge that
the funds might assist engagement in terrorism. 172 Five defendants were convicted on charges, ranging
across conspiracy, providing material support to a foreign terrorist organisation, providing funds for a
designated terrorist, money laundering and tax evasion. 173 As noted above, there are no Australian
convictions for reckless financing of terrorism and the relevant criminal law appears convoluted and
ineffectual.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

The World Vision Australia case demonstrates the potentially embarrassing consequences of delivering
humanitarian assistance in a high-risk conflict zone under an inadequate regulatory framework. There
can never be zero risk of misuse of charitable resources in zones of armed conflict but only diligent risk
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management. However, that diligent management is sometimes dominated by a politicised mission or
by the moral weight of the humanitarian imperative. Looking forward, how might the dilemma be
addressed?
First, the variable degrees of risk of terrorism financing need to be assessed in the various circumstances
of different operations and addressed individually. Assessing degrees of risk requires surveying the
local situation at the site of delivery, including armed conflict, political coercion, track records of local
aid delivery agents, host governments and civil society in combating tolerating or promoting terrorism;
then categorising these circumstances in terms of degree of risk of diversion of aid; and then matching
the categories to the charities’ proposed operations. It makes no sense that an identical typology should
apply in a Sydney local soup kitchen as in a Gaza warehouse.
Second, more engaged and rigorous oversight mechanisms are required for not-for-profit operations in
high risk categories. Ensuring that supervisors from the charity’s home base are continuously resident
in the high risk zone and tasked with pushing back against local stakeholder partisanship is a necessary
first step. Other risk management steps might include controls more qualitative than checklists to
undertake regular local inspections, vet staff, investigate suspect activities, and to produce compliance
reports for the organisational headquarters and national regulator.
Third, the governing legal system should be empowered to impose consequences upon a charity or notfor-profit organisation for non-compliance. The regulator could design individualised conditions of
operation, prescription or proscription of certain staff or directors, suspend funding, negate contracts,
require repayment of funding, and so on. Within the civil liability legal framework, redress in the form
of damages for victims or terrorist acts and in the form of restitution for donors whose funds were
misappropriated negligently or in bad faith should also be facilitated, as well as meaningful sanctions.
The criminal law should enable corporate and individual liability for cases of culpable negligence,
recklessness or criminal conduct and prosecute appropriately.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Australian regulatory framework for charitable operations overseas is evolving but does not yet
effectively deter overseas terrorism financing. The above analysis indicates that it needs to be more
situation-sensitive in risk assessment, to apply more rigorous preventive measures in high risk
categories, and to enable meaningful remedial consequences for cases of misuse of resources. The
comparison of Australian regulatory practice suggests that there are lessons from Canada on the better
use of criminal intelligence, and from England and Wales on better charities guidance and regulation,
whereas the United States provides sophisticated models for Australian consideration in the design of
safeguards for development assistance, remedies in civil liability and of criminal culpability.
Due diligence requirements could be calibrated to manage risks of terrorism support in overseas
environments prone to armed conflict. The ACNC counter-terrorism education and checklist program
could be made responsive to differences across operating environments overseas. External conduct
standards referred to in s 50.10 of the ACNC Act should be elaborated in ACNC regulations and greater
public transparency provided on overseas operations, as is the case in Canada.
A public complaints and public inquiry mechanism such as employed by the Charities Commission of
England and Wales could be a feature of the ACNC regulatory framework that would catalyse
investigations into misuse of funds to finance terrorism. It could be equipped with powers including
search and seizure, as well as asset freezing and confiscation. It could maintain cases on a public
database to improve transparency in the sector. The suite of due diligence guidance provided by the
ACNC could be extended by learning from the compliance toolkits provided in England and Wales.
AUSTRAC could develop a typology model to address the diversion of Australian charitable funds into
terrorism by Australian NGOs operating overseas to complement standards to be adopted under s 50.10
of the ACNC Act, particularly because the growing number of small Australian charities operating
overseas require attention. The national anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing risk
assessment in the not-for-profit sector being led by AUSTRAC (threat x vulnerability x consequences)
could be used by the ACNC to calibrate its regulatory oversight. Presently, there is a lack of calibration
of risk management to correspond with operational risk circumstances in distinctly different operating
environments. The ACNC should be able to access financial transaction information from AUSTRAC,
and vice versa, as contemplated pursuant to an amendment proposed for the AML/CTF Act.
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Concerning government provision of public funds for humanitarian assistance delivered through
charities in foreign conflict zones, the DFAT counter-terrorism due diligence and risk management
framework requires substance. Currently, it operates to minimise bureaucratic red tape and compliance
costs but provides less safeguards than comparable measures employed by Canada or the United States.
National counter-terrorism security intelligence could be accessed and considered, as it is in Canada,
when categorising the risk factors and track records for individual Australian NGOs. Australian
governmental security intelligence officials should be engaged in risk assessment processes. They
should participate in Canberra and in situ in the vetting of local partner organisations and key personnel,
as is the practice of USAID under Mission Order 21.
The Australian NGO accreditation process used by DFAT tends to emphasise front-end “in-principle”
commitments but needs emphasis on ongoing performance monitoring. In very high risk environments,
ongoing risk management measures should be acknowledged as a significant operating cost that
government funders incorporate into development aid project budgets, as does USAID. Australian
NGO staff who are locally engaged or are posted overseas also need to be vetted. The lack of
requirement of ongoing presence of Australia-based staff and the lack of whistle blower protections for
staff based overseas who may come under local peer pressure each magnify risks of improper use of
resources.
Australian federal law reforms to provide civil remedies for misuse of charitable funds could be
facilitated, so that donors can seek reimbursement. Elaboration of tort laws, as adopted in the United
States to facilitate civil jurisdiction and liability to victims of terrorist acts committed overseas but
funded by charities from within jurisdiction, should also be considered for introduction in Australia so
as to provide adequate payment of damages to victims. Finally, in relation to criminal prosecutions,
Div 103 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code needs to be revised to improve its clarity and workability
in circumstances of reckless financing of terrorism.
The recent development of Australian oversight for charities and not-for profit organisations ensures
that many avenues are available to improve current measures. Detailed consideration of a few of the
recommendations made in broad brush strokes above could lead to improved deterrence of Australian
charitable resourcing of terrorism abroad.
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